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aBStraCt: Services and goods in the new economy, such as social media platforms 
and applications, are often offered to end-consumers for “free”. This may cause prob-
lems for the application of traditional antitrust doctrines, such as tying or other forms 
of leveraging, which normally have been applied to products and services offered at 
a price. as illustrated by the Microsoft i decision (Windows Media Player), it is not 
self-evident that the bundling of an application with an operating system results in 
coercion, the pressure to consume the “tied” product, if consumers have a de facto pos-
sibility to download competing products for free. Moreover, the availability of com-
peting products for free may also affect the long-term effects in the market, as both 
the existing customer base and new customers may easily shift their consumption, 
which decreases potential “lock-in” effects. This propensity and capability of custom-
ers to choose products or services other than the predefined “default” option, e.g. by 
being included in a bundle, was also relevant in the recent Google decision (Shopping), 
which concerned the company’s preferential placement of its own advertising mes-
sages in internet searches. in both Microsoft i and the Google decision, it was found 
that consumers were unable to choose products and services other than the default 
option, so-called consumer inertia. Consumer inertia has been explained both by the 
traditional law and economics literature and behavioural economics with switching 
costs, information costs and the status quo bias. accordingly, this article explores the 
concept of consumer inertia in the light of the law and economics literature, in particu-
lar behavioural economics, to determine the factors which are relevant for establish-
ing the presence of consumer inertia in individual antitrust cases concerning the new 
economy. Moreover, the article evaluates to what extent the use of consumer inertia in 
cases from the Union courts and the Commission is consistent with economic theory. 
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1. Introduction
The behaviour of consumers is crucial for the economic models that 
antitrust relies on. Without knowing the consumer’s reaction to price 
increases, marketing, sales methods and contracts, it is impossible to 
assess the current and future effects of measures taken by firms and ulti-
mately their effect on competition. While a well-informed consumer that 
makes well-thought and intelligent decisions may engage in the search for 
better alternatives and thereby “punish” the attempt of firms to impose 
negative policies, a less informed consumer may accept such measures, 
which implies a certain degree of market power in the hands of their 
supplier. obviously, the difference between well-informed and less well-
informed consumers may have an impact on the measures taken by firms 
and their effect on competition. While traditional economic theory has 
assumed a certain degree of consumer awareness, a degree of activity in 
the searching of alternatives and the calculation of costs and benefits, as 
well as a certain degree of objectivity in the balancing between different 
alternatives when making choices that maximise their utility, satisfac-
tion or needs, current trends in economic theory have a different view 
on consumers’ choices. Consumers may be uninformed, lazy, inconsist-
ent and non-objective in their decision-making. This, in theory, gives 
more leeway for firms to introduce policies which have a negative impact 
on consumers and competition by other firms. an example of these fea-
tures that makes consumers less rational than assumed in traditional 
economic theory is so-called consumer inertia. recent antitrust enforce-
ment shows that the Commission is aware of consumers’ inability to 
make fully rational and informed choices because of so-called consumer 
inertia. accordingly, this article explores the concept of consumer iner-
tia in economic theory and analyses competition law cases where such 
inertia is arguably present.
2. What is consumer inertia?
Somewhat simplified, with consumer inertia, or the status quo bias, it is 
meant that human beings stay passive instead of making an active choice, 
or refrain from taking an action that changes the status quo that would 
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be economically rational to do.1 typical examples from real-life markets 
are consumers that do not switch from their bank or electricity company 
even when States have adopted legal rules actively promoting such switch-
ing. obviously, the concept of consumer inertia is related to the general 
assumption in economic theory that individuals act in a rational man-
ner. Consumer inertia or the status quo bias is mainly attributed to behav-
ioural economics.2 However, consumer inertia has also, and may also be 
explained by more “traditional” branches of economic theory. This sub-
section will therefore discuss how consumer inertia may be construed 
according to economic theory. 
it is generally assumed that traditional branches of economic theories 
like the early Chicago School make a strong assumption of individuals’ 
rationality.3 Thus, in such models, an individual (natural or legal person) 
would acquire an optimal amount of information and engage in balanc-
ing the “pros and cons” in the processing of available information when 
maximising utility.4 Exactly how strong such an assumption is could be 
debated. different models may express different views on the degree of the 
individual’s rationality as well as  access to information. Certain branches 
of economic theory, such as transactional Cost Economics (tCE), have 
obviously relaxed the degree of rationality expressed by individuals as 
well as the amount of information available.5 it is not uncommon that 
uncertainty (about e.g. possible future events) is taken in as a factor or 
that a distinction is made between short-term and long-term incentives. 
accordingly, the exact degree of rationality assumed in economic rea-
soning may greatly differ among different schools of economics, different 
scholars, as well as specific models. a minimum common element, per-
haps, is the assumption that a (rational) individual would take the available 
information (e.g. current and past experience as well as information that 
1 Beata Mäihäniemi, “The role of innovation in the analysis of abuse of dominance in digital 
markets: The analysis of chosen practices of Google Search”, Market and Competition Law 
Review 1 (2017): 118.
2 Christopher decker, “Concepts of the consumer in competition, regulatory and consumer pro-
tection policies”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 13 (2017): 151-184.
3 Maurice E. Stucke, “Behavioral antitrust and monopolization”, Journal of Competition Law and 
Economics 8 (2012): 545. 
4 decker, “Concepts of the consumer”, 155.
5 oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 
45-46; oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New 
York: The Free Press, 1975), 21-23.
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may be acquired) into consideration and engage in a somewhat complex 
cost-benefit analysis in order to maximise utility. importantly, what would 
“impact” the individual in such a context that could lead to an “irrational” 
decision are factors that are normally characterised as different types of 
costs, e.g. costs of acquiring sufficient information (information costs) to 
make a rational decision.6
as regards consumer inertia, it would constitute one of those factors 
under traditional economic theories that constitutes or that results in so-
called switching costs. it has e.g. long been recognised that products and 
services may be differentiated, which makes consumers non-price sensitive 
as price cuts would not necessarily result in switching between suppliers. 
This price insensitivity, or brand loyalty, is also a form of consumer inertia 
that can either be seen as a form of switching cost (from brand switching)
and/or a factor that increases costs for rivals and new entrants to compete 
for a particular (incumbent) supplier’s installed base.7 The main point is 
that customers forming part of the installed base may seem to behave irra-
tionally if one would only measure the utility of the supplier’s goods or 
services in terms of objective factors such as price and quality. Moreover, 
it has also been acknowledged under traditional economic theory that 
consumers, under special circumstances, may not make well-informed 
choices, e.g. between competing systems, resulting in consumers being 
“locked-in” and opening up for exploitation through e.g. higher prices in 
aftermarkets.8 also, in this example, the consumer does not make a fully 
rational choice and such irrational behaviour is explained by the fact that 
the well-informed and rational consumer did not have access to transpar-
ent information or that the economic incentives to seek information were 
not high enough (as information costs were too high) to engage in a full-
scale cost-benefit analysis. While the aftermarkets example does not con-
stitute an example of consumer inertia, it demonstrates that traditional 
economic theory also considers “rationality” problems in terms of infor-
mation costs because of non-transparent information and lack of informa-
tion, as well as switching costs.  
6 See e.g. Steven Salop and Joseph Stiglitz, “Bargains and rip-offs: a model of monopolistically 
competitive price dispersion”, The Review of Economic Studies 44, no. 3 (1977): 493. 
7 For the view that brand loyalty is an expression of perceived switching costs by the consumer, see 
Paul Klemperer, “Competition when consumers have switching costs: an overview with applica-
tions to industrial organization, macroeconomics and international trade”, Review of Economic 
Studies 62 (1995): 518. 
8 Carl Shapiro, “Making sense of Kodak”, Antitrust Law Journal 63 (1995): 483.
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By contrast to traditional economic theory, behavioural economics 
challenges the essential tenets of rationality, stable preferences and util-
ity maximisation. according to behavioural economics, individuals 
instead express bounded rationality, bounded self-control and bounded 
self-interest.9 Thus, making predictions about human behaviour requires 
the consideration of a number of biases (normally found and established 
through field studies)10 that will impact rationality, preferences and utility 
maximisation.
Under this framework, consumer inertia is caused by bounded rational-
ity. Consumer inertia may be caused by the bias that human beings care 
more about losses than about gains (loss aversion). This has been referred 
to as the so-called endowment effect.11 With endowment effect it is meant 
that human beings would ask for more to sell an endowment than they 
would be willing to pay for it to acquire it.12 For that reason, consumers 
tend to stick to the status quo as a change may mean that they will end up 
in a situation worse-off.13 Thus, even when there are offers that are better 
for consumers, they may still not be liable to switch suppliers.14 Moreover, 
consumer inertia may also be caused by the fact that human beings shy 
away from making choices in the case of too many (choice overload) or 
complex alternatives.15 Finally, the status quo bias may also be caused by 
prior commitments in terms of sunk costs. Having once committed, an 
individual may want to avoid regretting their prior decision, which pro-
motes the status quo.16 all in all, the consequence of consumer inertia is 
that consumers may avoid to make choices or to switch suppliers even 
9 amanda P. reeves and Maurice E. Stucke, “Behavioral antitrust”, Indiana Law Journal 86, no. 4 
(2011): 1532.
10 andreas Heinemann, “Behavioral antitrust – a more realistic approach to antitrust”, in 
European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics, ed. Klaus Mathis (Springer, 2015), 214.
11 William E. Kovacic and James C. Cooper, “Behavioral economics and its meaning for antitrust 
agency decision making”, Journal of Law, Economics and Policy 8 (2012): 787.
12 Maurice Stucke, “Behavioral economists at the gate: antitrust in the twenty-first century”, 
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 38 (2007): 513-591; daniel Kahneman, Jack l. Knetsch and 
richard H. Thaler, “Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem”, Journal 
of Political Economy 98, no. 6 (1990): 1325-1348. 
13 Kovacic and Coooper, “Behavioral economics”, 787.
14 Mike Walker, “Behavioral economics: The lessons for regulators”, European Competition Law 
Journal 13 (2017): 6; Heinemann, “Behavioral antitrust”, 215-216.
15 Walker, “Behavioral economics”, 6; William Samuelson and richard Zeckhauser, “Status quo 
bias in decision making”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1988): 36-37.
16 Samuelson and Zeckhauser, “Status quo bias”, 37-38.
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when there is formally competition in the market. Thus, suppliers with 
a large installed base may be protected from actual competition and/or 
incumbents may be protected from potential competition. Consequently, 
it also opens up for suppliers to rely on consumer inertia by positioning 
themselves as the “default option” or making choices complex, thereby 
limiting competition.17 
arguably, there is a problem with the behavioural approach to consumer 
inertia from a practical perspective. The literature on consumer inertia, 
while basing itself on empirical studies that demonstrate the existence of 
such bias, does not seem to explain sufficiently what would affect the pres-
ence and differences in the degree of inertia. This is crucial for the appli-
cation of consumer inertia as a factor in antitrust cases. as the literature 
points out, the same factor that may lead to consumer inertia in some cases 
will yield positive effects for consumers in other cases. For instance, few 
scholars would argue that the multitude of choices in larger supermar-
kets could cause harm to consumers by choice overload.18 in fact, consum-
ers seem to prefer such supermarkets because of the availability of sev-
eral alternatives. By contrast, when employees have the option on how to 
allocate their savings for retirement between different equity funds choice 
overload may become a problem.19 obviously, the acceptance of consumer 
inertia as a theory cannot mean that such a bias is always present irrespec-
tive of the characteristic of the market or consumer group in the specific 
case. otherwise, one assumption, that consumers are fully rational, would 
be substituted by another assumption, that consumers always have the 
tendency to stick to the status quo. From a competition law perspective, 
the latter assumption seems equally problematic to the traditional starting 
point and is likely to lead to erroneous results. 
irrespective of whether a more traditional cost-oriented approach or a 
behavioural approach is accepted, perhaps the more interesting issue con-
cerns how to establish the presence of consumer inertia as a practical mat-
ter in real cases. arguably, a more traditional cost-oriented approach may 
be easier to apply in the form of a theoretical argument. The establishing of 
17 Walker, “Behavioral economics”, 7.
18 Judith Metha (ed.), “Behavioral economics in competition and consumer policy”, Centre for 
competition policy, University of East anglia, accessed 8 March, 2018: 46. http://competitionpol-
icy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8193541/CCP+economics+book+Final+digital+version+-+colour.
pdf/30214557-cace-4b0b-8aac-a801bbde87bc.
19 Mehta, “Behavioral economics”, 47.
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particular costs, e.g. transition costs or information costs caused by trans-
parency issues or uncertainty in relation to the specific consumer group in 
a particular case could possibly be carried out without the backing up of 
those claims with empirical evidence of consumer/customer behavioural 
patterns.20 For instance, as regards the issue of information costs in rela-
tion to lock-in effects in aftermarkets, factors such as the nature or the 
value of the product, as well as the identity of the consumer are likely to 
have an impact on the viability of the argument of lock-in effects.21 For 
the reasons mentioned above, a behavioural approach could be seen as 
more speculative. Even though the finding of different biases is backed up 
by empirical studies, it does not mean that such biases are applicable in 
the specific market(s) in a given case. For instance, while a competition 
authority may show that consumers are required to engage in complex 
calculations in a specific market, it may be too speculative to claim that 
they will result in the use of (erroneous) rules of thumb or inertia by con-
sumers if the bias cannot be connected to the (cognitive) characteristics 
of the particular consumer group. in addition, different groups of con-
sumers within the same market may also differ as to the extent to which 
they are subject to consumer inertia. in theory, the group of rational con-
sumers may be sufficiently large as to eliminate potential negative effects 
of consumer inertia by disciplining the behaviour of suppliers. Thus, an 
antitrust assessment would also have to consider the share of consumers 
that may be subject to inertia and its impact on the market. Naturally, as 
follows from the few cases discussed below, the behavioural approach may 
be successful if used as an explanation for already established consumer 
patterns through empirical evidence, such as customer surveys. However, 
when such empirical evidence is not available in a specific case, the use of 
consumer inertia has to rely on theoretical arguments. accordingly, there 
is a need to discuss in more depth what specific factors may affect the cog-
nitive capacity of consumer groups resulting in consumer inertia. This is 
particularly important in enforcement that relies heavily on a prospective 
analysis such as merger cases, where customer surveys may not exist at 
20 See e.g. the discussion on transition costs as a rationality-based explanation for the status quo 
bias in Samuelson and Zeckhauser, “Status quo bias”, 33-35.
21 See e.g. the discussion in Judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) of 15 december 
2010, Confédération européenne des associations d’horlogers-réparateurs (CEAHR) v. European 
Commission, Case t-427/08, EU:t:2010:517, paragraph 106, and Eastman Kodak Company v. 
Image Technical Services, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992): 2085-2088.
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the time of the competition authority’s decision. This assertion should not 
be seen as an essential criticism of the behavioural approach to consumer 
inertia, but rather as a claim that the discussion in current antitrust legal 
writing on consumer inertia is somewhat undeveloped.      
3. Consumer inertia and the new economy
although consumer inertia is not by necessity related to the new economy, 
it is noteworthy that some of the current and most interesting antitrust 
cases on consumer inertia address sectors that belong to the new econo-
my.22 a great deal has been written about the new economy and its distinct 
characteristics that are interesting from an antitrust law perspective.23 
Features of the new economy, in particular, have raised issues regarding 
the accuracy of the definition of relevant markets,24 the handling of inter-
connection between different markets, in certain multi-sided markets,25 
the sharing economy,26 the importance of network effects,27 the impor-
tance that products and services are free of charge,28 the importance of 
data,29 the high rate of innovation,30 as well as the assessment of anti-com-
petitive effects in markets characterised by one or several of the features 
enumerated above, especially when they result in competition for markets 
instead of within markets. accordingly, this section addresses consumer 
inertia in the context of the new economy.  
in the context of the new economy, it seems that consumer inertia 
becomes particularly relevant in relation to multi-sided markets and 
22 See e.g. the discussion below in section 5 on Commission decision, at.39740 Google Search 
(Shopping), C (2017) 4444 final (Google Shopping) and Commission decision of 6 december 2016 
(M.8124 – Microsoft/linkedin).
23 The main features of the new economy where already presented in e.g. richard Posner, “antitrust 
in the new economy”, Antitrust Law Journal 68 (2001): 925-943.
24 antonio robles Martín-laborda, “Merger control and online platforms: The relevance of net-
work effects”, Market and Competition Law Review 1 (2017): 74-78; Joyce Verhaert, “The challenges 
involved with the application of article 102 tFEU to the new economy: a case study of Google”, 
European Competition Law Review 35 (2014): 267.
25 Mäihäniemi, “The role of innovation”, 114; Verhaert, “Challenges”, 267; Martín-laborda, 
“Mergel control”.
26 See e.g. Vassili Hatzopoulos and Sofia roma, “Caring for sharing? The collaborative economy 
under EU law”, Common Market Law Review 54 (2017):109-112. 
27 Posner, “antitrust in the new economy”, 930; Verhaert, “Challenges”, 267.
28 Maurice E. Stucke and allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (oxford: oxford 
University Press, 2016), Chapter 7.
29 See e.g. Stucke and Grunes, “Big data”, Chapter 4.
30 Verhaert, “Challenges”, 266.
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thereby indirect network effects. Multi-sided markets are characterised by 
the fact that the offering of products or services (on a specific market) is 
interlinked and interdependent with the offering of another product or 
service (which would constitute a different but interconnected market).31 
The success in the offering of e.g. an operating system (oS) is dependent on 
the amount of applications designed for the particular oS. Thus, the more 
customers use the particular oS, the more attractive it becomes to develop 
applications for it. in other words, it becomes easier for the supplier of 
the oS to “sell” access to application developers. Similarly, the more a 
credit card provider can convince merchants to accept a card, the more 
attractive it becomes for potential card users to acquire the credit card. 
accordingly, the two groups of customers, the users of the credit cards and 
the merchants using the credit card network are dependent on each other 
and the intermediary, the credit card network, works as the vehicle for 
transactions between the two groups.32 The consequence of markets being 
interconnected in this fashion is that occurrences in one market also have 
repercussions on the interconnected market. For instance, a price increase 
in one of the interconnected markets which decreases demand may also 
decrease interest for suppliers of products in the interconnected market.33 
Thus, both market definition and analysis of anti-competitive effects can-
not be carried out only focusing on one of the interconnected markets but 
require the assessment of potential effects in other interconnected mar-
kets. in addition, companies may consciously take into account the effects 
across the different interconnected markets when adopting a particular 
behaviour.
Moreover, the fact that markets are multi-sided also means that the 
provision of services and products is subject to network effects. Network 
effects are categorised, according to the literature, into direct and indirect 
network effects.34 With direct network effects it is meant that customers 
would have an increased utility, the higher the amount of other custom-
ers (within the same market) using the product or service in question. For 
31 See e.g. Jean-Charles rochet and Jean tirole, “Platform competition in two-sided markets”, 
Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (2003): 990-1029. 
32 oECd roundtable on two sided markets (2009), accessed 10 March, 2018: 11. https://www.oecd.
org/daf/competition/44445730.pdf.
33 daniel Mandrescu, “applying EU Competition law to online platforms: the road ahead – Part 
1”, European Competition Law Review 38 (2017): 355; oECd roundtable on two sided markets, 11.
34 daniel Mandrescu, “applying EU Competition law to online platforms: the road ahead – 
Part 1”, European Competition Law Review 38 (2017): 355.
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instance, the more users of a particular oS, the higher the utility for each 
individual user as they can share files with other users. By contrast, with 
indirect network effects it is meant that users of a certain product gain 
a higher utility, the more products or services are provided by suppliers 
(in the interconnected market) based on the product in question and vice 
versa. as explained above, developers of applications for a particular oS 
get a higher utility, the larger the installed base of the oS in question. While 
the presence of direct network effects is prominent in many markets, indi-
rect network effects are directly relevant to multi-sided markets.35 Thus, 
indirect network effects may gravitate users in the different interconnected 
markets to a particular product to such an extent that it becomes difficult 
for rivals to challenge a product that has a critical mass of users/suppliers 
(in all of the affected interconnected markets). 
in the context described above, it appears as consumer inertia may 
become relevant in two ways. Firstly, consumer inertia may be a factor that 
contributes to a position of market power by limiting competition between 
suppliers. However, it seems as consumer inertia must be combined with 
other (probably more) important factors, such as network effects and other 
entry barriers that lead to a situation of market power. While consumer 
inertia is a factor that results in the status quo, e.g. by dis-incentivising con-
sumers to make a choice other than the default option, other factors affect 
the choice of the default option. Both direct and indirect network effects 
may “tip” the market to choose a specific product or service as a default 
option, e.g. by incentivising a supplier to choose a “must-have” product 
or incentivising suppliers of products in the interconnected markets to 
choose a particular platform or system. overcoming direct network effects 
requires a rival to catch up by reaching a critical mass of users to challenge 
the dominant supplier. additionally, overcoming indirect network effects 
in multi-sided markets requires the reaching of a critical mass also in the 
interconnected markets. obviously, indirect network effects make it very 
hard for rivals by increasing the costs of both entry and expansion. 
Secondly, consumer inertia may provide a mechanism for suppliers to 
leverage their market power in between the different interconnected mar-
kets. Suppliers may actively position themselves as the default option either 
through contracts or technical means, such as the technical integration 
of two products. Thus, even though suppliers do not “create” consumer 
35 oECd roundtable on two sided markets, 11.
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inertia, they take advantage of this cognitive bias in the consumer group 
and thus raise costs for rivals, which have to overcome consumer inertia.
outside the context of multi-sided markets, consumer inertia may also 
become relevant when supply of services is formally free of charge but 
requires or permits the collection of users’ personal data. Market power 
may be seen as the ability to charge supra-competitive prices profitably 
for a longer period of time.36 assessing whether a supra-competitive price 
has been charged presumes that consumers actually perceive the price for 
the supplied product or service as a supra-competitive price. However, the 
supply of services such as general internet searches or social platforms is 
commonly free of charge. instead, the provider of these services will nor-
mally impose conditions for use whereby consumers agree to submit per-
sonal data. it seems as most consumers would not make an actual evalua-
tion of such conditions.37 it seems arguable that such consumer behaviour 
could be attributed to consumer inertia as, for most consumers, scrutinis-
ing conditions of use is simply a task that is too complex. Probably, for 
most consumers agreeing to conditions which result in the transferring of 
personal data is not even seen as a “cost”, which underlines that consumers 
in real markets may not engage in an in-depth cost and benefit analysis. 
The result of this consumer behaviour is that consumers may be more eas-
ily “exploited” through the imposition of unfair conditions or supra-com-
petitive charges in the antitrust sense without being aware of it. 
 
4. The use of consumer inertia in antitrust law
it follows from the description of consumer inertia above that it has the 
particular effect of a switching cost impeding the shift from the consump-
tion of one product or service to competing products or services. arguably, 
consumer inertia may be relevant in the application of antitrust rules in 
three different situations. Firstly, it may constitute a factor that contributes 
to a position of market power, in particular a dominant position in the con-
text of applying article 102 tFEU or the Merger regulation.38 Secondly, 
consumer inertia may also be relevant for the establishment of anti-com-
petitive behaviour either in the form of abuse under article 102 tFEU or 
36 robert landes and richard Posner, “Market power in antitrust cases”, Harvard Law Review 94 
(1981): 937-996.
37 Stucke and Grunes, “Big data”, 120-121.
38 Council regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, oJ [2004] l 24/1 (Merger regulation). 
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as part of the prospective effects, constituting a significant impediment to 
effective competition under the substantial test in the Merger regulation.39 
Moreover, it has also been claimed that inertia may also be used to impede 
cheating in cartel arrangements.40 However, considering the type of cases 
discussed below (section 5), this particular situation will not be addressed 
further. 
as regards consumer inertia as an element that creates or supports a 
position of market power, it has been discussed above that consumer iner-
tia leads to less switching between products or services. The effects of con-
sumer inertia may also be accentuated by other mechanisms common in 
the new economy, like the indirect network effects in multi-sided markets. 
as a consequence, competing suppliers would probably have to overcome 
such effects by investing in more marketing towards consumers, by con-
cluding costly contracts to outrival the positioning of the strong incum-
bent supplier, or by entering several markets in order to take advantage of 
consumer inertia for their own supplies. accordingly, consumer inertia 
may have the same effect as a barrier to entry or expansion, or as a sup-
porting factor resulting in such barriers, leading to less competitive pres-
sure from actual and potential competitors.
The second possibility for consumer inertia to come into the antitrust 
analysis is as a mechanism used as part of an exclusionary strategy. The 
obvious example is tying, which may be assessed both under article 102 
tFEU and the Merger regulation.41 The demonstration of tying as an 
abuse requires showing that the products belong to two separate markets, 
that the customer is coerced to acquire the tied product (coercion), that 
competition is eliminated, and that there is no objective justification.42 it 
must be noted that the border line between coercion and the elimination 
of competition in tying/bundling cases is not clear-cut. Coercion is the 
element that may result in the elimination of competition by discouraging 
39 Merger regulation, article 2(3).
40 iwan Bos, ronald Peeters and Erik Pot, “Competition versus collusion: The impact of consumer 
inertia”, International Journal of Economic Theory 13 (2017): 387.  
41 This is relevant for the assessment of conglomerate mergers. Guidelines on the assessment of 
non-horizontal mergers under the Council regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, [2008] oJ C 265/6, paragraph 93; Judgment of the Court of First instance (First 
Chamber) of 25 october 2002, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission of the European Communities, Case 
t-5/02, EU:t:2002:264.
42 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraphs 850-870.
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the substitution of the tied product. Coercion is thus the first of two tests 
required to demonstrate anti-competitive effects in an individual case. 
While it is not possible to show anti-competitive effects without coercion, 
it could still be the case that a dominant supplier has engaged in coercion 
but no elimination of competition has actually occurred. The tying/bun-
dling measure may still not effectively prevent the substitution of the tied 
product, and suppliers of alternative products may still apply counterstrat-
egies to protect or increase market shares.
Consumer inertia may be used to support a tying or bundling measure 
which does not constitute an outright contractual tying but still results 
in coercion.43 While traditional situations of tying and bundling typi-
cally result in added costs for those customers that want to circumvent the 
tying measure, the same does not necessarily apply to markets in the new 
economy where products are technically integrated (technical bundling). 
as explained above, one of the features of the new economy is the fact 
that many services offered through the internet to consumers are “free 
of charge”. in addition, the distribution of products or services may be 
perceived as being costless and relatively easy. The issue of additional costs 
is important in the antitrust assessment of tying. it is normally the addi-
tional costs that constitute the impediment for the customer to switch to 
rival suppliers. two products offered together at a lower price than when 
sold separately provides a direct economic incentive to purchase the bun-
dle. Similarly, contractual tying results in added costs for customers that 
nonetheless would prefer purchasing competing substitutable products. 
accordingly, when a tied product is available free of charge, customers are 
not necessarily impeded from using alternative products to the tied prod-
uct. Moreover, if the coercive measure is directed towards an intermediary, 
like a reseller, availability of substitutes free of charge for end-consumers 
may still open up the market for rivals to the dominant supplier. 
it is in this context that consumer inertia may be a relevant factor which 
results in a coercive effect or in the elimination of competition. if custom-
ers (like resellers) or end-consumers are subject to consumer inertia, this 
mechanism will impede switching irrespective of there being no actual 
costs for acquiring the substitutable product. Thus, consumer inertia may 
contribute to the coercive effect of technical bundling and/or impede 
switching to rival products, resulting in the elimination of competition. 
43 Heinemann, “Behavioral antitrust”, 234.
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another abuse in which consumer inertia may be relevant is refusal 
to supply. according to the case law, three conditions must be met for 
establishing the abuse: indispensability of access to the infrastructure or 
the input product; elimination of competition in a neighbouring market 
caused by the refusal to supply; and no objective justification for the refusal 
to supply.44 in addition, as regards refusal to license intellectual property 
rights, it is additionally required that the refusal hinders the emergence 
of a new product.45 arguably, consumer inertia may become relevant as 
concerns both the requirements of indispensability as well as the elimi-
nation of competition. a dominant supplier of e.g. a platform or a soft-
ware program may take advantage of consumer inertia to boost its sales 
of additional products or services. The existence of multi-sided markets 
is likely to create situations where the possibility to enter into one market 
is dependent on the access to the other side of the market. Thus, rivals 
to the dominant supplier will need access to the necessary “infrastruc-
ture” or platform on one side of the market to effectively compete on the 
other side of it. in this context, consumer inertia results in a disadvantage 
if consumers tend to choose products that are directly accessible through 
the particular infrastructure or platform, even if there are other potential 
distribution channels. accordingly, the presence of consumer inertia may 
be relevant for showing the indispensability of access to the infrastruc-
ture, as well as for demonstrating that alternative distribution channels 
are not effective, which results in the elimination of competition in the 
neighbouring market.   
5.  The direct and indirect application of consumer inertia  
in antitrust cases
The purpose of this section is to give account of those few cases where con-
sumer inertia appears to have played a role in antitrust cases. The different 
subsections focus particularly on how consumer inertia is perceived and 
discussed by the Courts and the Commission, analysing recent antitrust 
44 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 November 1998, Oscar Bronner GmbH 
& Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint 
Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 
Case C-7/97, EU:C:1998:569, paragraph 41.
45 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 april 2004, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC 
Health GmbH & Co. KG., Case C-418/01, EU:C:2004:257, paragraph 52.
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cases concerning the new economy where consumer inertia arguably 
played a role.
5.1. Microsoft Windows Media Player and Internet Explorer
The most noteworthy case where the idea of consumer inertia may have 
influenced the application of antitrust rules is Microsoft, where the com-
pany had abused its dominant position by “tying” Windows Media Player 
(WMP) with the operating system (oS) for PCs.46 The tying abuse in 
Microsoft concerned the technological bundling of the operating system 
with the media player. Thus, the case concerned an untraditional form of 
tying. as explained above, tying requires some form of coercion. in previ-
ous cases, such as tetra Pak and Hilti, customers were coerced through the 
contracts or conditions imposed for purchases.47 However, technological 
bundling differs as two products are simply integrated into one product. 
an additional relevant fact in the case was that rivals to Microsoft offered 
products competing with the tied product, media players, free of charge. 
Consequently, these circumstances raised two specific issues in the dem-
onstration of tying: firstly, whether customers were coerced to buy the 
additional product; secondly, whether the coercion in question resulted in 
the exclusion of competitors. 
importantly, the General Court (then the Court of First instance) found 
that the majority of sales of Windows oS occurred through the sales of 
the out-of-the-box PC, that is, the sales of a new computer together with 
the Windows oS. Thus, the main focus of the case was the licensing of 
the oS to the original equipment manufacturers, the oEMs, which were 
putting together the PCs with additional software and selling them to the 
public. The Court found that coercion occurred through both contractual 
and technological tying.48 Firstly, there was contractual tying as the licence 
for the oS also included a licence for the media player and licences only 
for the media player were not granted. Thus, while it was theoretically pos-
sible for the oEMs to purchase a licence for an additional non-Microsoft 
46 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289.
47 Commission decision 88/138/EEC (iV/30.787 and 31.488 - Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti) oJ [1988] l 
65/19 (Hilti decision); Commission decision 92/163/EEC of 24 July 1991 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to article 86 of the EEC treaty (iV/31043 - tetra Pak ii) oJ [1992] l 72/1 (tetra Pak ii 
decision).
48 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraphs 962-965.
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media player, cost constraints would impede the oEMs from adding an 
extra media player. Secondly, there was also technological tying as it was 
not possible to uninstall WMP. Consequently, it was not technically pos-
sible to offer a computer which would only include a competing media 
player. in response, Microsoft argued that there was no coercion as the 
media player was included for free and that it was still possible for consum-
ers to download and install competing media players for free. The Court 
dismissed the argument that the media player was provided for free as 
a matter of fact. Moreover, the Court found that it was not necessary to 
demonstrate that end-consumers had to pay a certain price for coercion to 
be proved as a matter of law.49 as concerns the argument on the possibility 
to access other competing media players, the Court made a cross-reference 
to its reasoning on the elimination of the competition criterion.50 in that 
reasoning, discussed in more detail below, the Court found that the oEMs 
were deterred from installing a second media player and that end-con-
sumers had incentives to use the pre-installed media player. although not 
explicitly stated by the Court, it seems as it did not find the argument par-
ticularly relevant for the discussion on coercion. rather, the Court seems 
to have established coercion through the contractual and technical tying 
described above. For the few sales that occurred by end-users purchasing a 
Windows oS separately from a computer and directly from a retailer, the 
licensing conditions, which were identical to those applied to oEMs, lead 
to the same outcome.   
as regards the elimination of the competition criterion, the Commission 
relied on a number of arguments which were reaffirmed by the Court. it 
was argued, inter alia, that the technological bundling constituted a more 
efficient method of distribution, that the pre-installation of competing 
media players resulted in added costs for oEMs which therefore were 
given a disincentive for such a pre-installation, and that the omnipres-
ence of WMP led to network effects inducing content providers to develop 
content for WMP.51 as part of the argument demonstrating the advan-
tage of technological bundling as a distribution form, the Court addressed 
49 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 969.
50 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 971.
51 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1031-1089.
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the issue of consumer inertia. it was held that downloading of competing 
media players was theoretically possible, sometimes also for free, and that 
the internet made such downloading inexpensive.52 Thus, the exclusionary 
effects of the tying measures directed at oEMs could in theory be miti-
gated by end-consumers downloading media players from competitors to 
Microsoft. However, it was also found that, at the time of the Microsoft 
decision, downloading was seen as complicated and that many download-
ing attempts failed.53 Moreover, the Court also relied on market surveys 
referred to in the Commission’s decision showing that most consumers 
found that the pre-installed product would function better than products 
that had been downloaded and installed by end-users.54 Thus, the Court 
found that “vendors must deploy major resources to ‘overcome end-users’ 
inertia and persuade them to ignore the pre-installation of [Windows 
Media Player]”.55 additionally, the Court also found that even if there were 
consumers that would engage in such downloading of competing media 
players, WMP would nevertheless always be present in the oS as it was not 
possible to uninstall it.56 
it follows that the Court did consider consumer inertia in its finding 
of tying, but not that the inertia was necessarily caused by the reasons as 
explained by behavioural economics. rather, the emphasis in the Court’s 
reasoning seems to lie in the “costs” caused by the downloading and instal-
lation performed by the end-users, as well as by the decreased functional-
ity of such installation. The reasoning could probably also be construed as 
a reluctance by end-users to engage in the downloading and installation, 
which could leave the end-user “worse off” as a cognitive impediment to 
engage in switching. instead, the Court appears mainly to have specified 
the switching costs affecting end-users’ decision. The underlying reasons 
for the consumer inertia in the case seem to correspond with the view 
of the end-user acting as an economic rational consumer. it appears as 
52 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1052.
53 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1050.
54 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1050.
55 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1052.
56 Judgment of the Court of First instance (Grand Chamber) of 17 September 2007, Microsoft Corp. 
v. Commission of the European Communities, Case t-201/04, EU:t:2007:289, paragraph 1083.
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the judgment can therefore not be seen as an incontestable support for a 
“behavioural argument”. Moreover, it should be underlined that Microsoft 
does not support that the element of coercion may necessarily be proven 
solely by the presence of consumer inertia. The Court focused more on the 
contractual tying imposed on oEMs and the unavailability of Windows 
oS without WMP. Such argumentation does not differ much from the 
more traditional tying cases such as Hilti and tetra Pak ii.
The presence of consumer inertia in the behavioural sense was clearer 
in the Commission’s commitment decision in internet Explorer.57 in this 
case, the company had engaged in more or less the same practices as in 
Microsoft. The oEMs were, by contract, obliged to pre-install internet 
Explorer as the default web browser. also in this case, it was found that 
oEMs would not install a second web browser. Echoing the General Court’s 
judgment in Microsoft, the Commission acknowledged that free down-
load was an inexpensive way of distribution of competing web browsers. 
it also conceded that broadband access was more common at the time of 
the decision. However, it also found that downloading would still not be an 
effective way of distribution to consumers. This was caused by two factors. 
First, there were barriers to downloading in the form of technical skills for 
searching, downloading and installing. Second, there was simply inertia 
to engage in such activities. These arguments were backed up by a con-
sumer survey that showed that a majority of consumers did not engage in 
downloading a second web browser when there was a pre-installed one.58 
arguably, the decision gives a stronger support for the behavioural argu-
ment. The Commission did not only refer to factors that could be trans-
lated into costs such as searching and performing the downloading and 
installation of the software, but also presented the presence of consumer 
inertia as a separate factor.    
5.2. Google Shopping
in June 2017 the Commission adopted a decision in one of the cases 
involving Google regarding their comparative shopping services (Google 
Shopping).59 Comparative shopping services are internet-based platforms 
57 Commission decision of 16 december 2009, Microsoft tying CoMP/C-3/39.530 (internet 
Explorer).
58 internet Explorer, recitals 45-52.
59 Commission decision, at.39740 Google Search (Shopping), C(2017) 4444 final (Google 
Shopping).
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which permit the consumer to compare prices between different suppli-
ers of the same product or service. Performing a search on the internet 
through a general search engine (like Google or Bing) may generate hits on 
basis of comparative shopping services which link to the site providing the 
price comparison. The consumer may subsequently reach the site of the 
merchant by clicking the link in the comparative shopping service website. 
The Commission found in its decision that a general search service is a 
different product market than comparative shopping services.60 Moreover, 
it concluded that Google held a dominant position in the market for gen-
eral internet search services.61 as regards the abuse, the Commission 
found that Google had created a system where its own comparative shop-
ping services would be promoted while competing comparative shopping 
services were demoted.62 
Much simplified, the abusive conduct was implemented through two 
measures. importantly, Google uses an algorithm (that searches through 
the whole internet) that ranks the different relevant web pages. Following 
a query, the algorithm evaluates the number and the quality of links to 
the particular webpage as a method of ranking the different relevant web-
pages.63 in addition, other algorithms are used to adjust the ranking of the 
relevant webpages. according to the Commission, Google had introduced 
an algorithm (so-called Panda) in its provision of generic search services 
which would “demote” the ranking of webpages, inter alia, on the grounds 
of lacking original content, e.g. when the content of the webpage (like a 
comparative shopping service site) would stem from another webpage (like 
the merchant offering the product and service in question). The effect of 
the algorithm was that comparative shopping webpages would be ranked 
much lower (showing further down the list of search results), thus attract-
ing less numbers of user-clicks. While this first measure demoted compet-
ing shopping services, Google also applied a second measure to promote 
its own shopping services. The adjustment algorithm that demoted com-
peting shopping services did not apply to Google’s own shopping servic-
es.64 additionally, relevant hits to a query based on Google’s own shopping 
services was also presented separately on top (and/or the middle) of the 
60 Google Shopping, recitals 145-270.
61 Google Shopping, recitals 271-330.
62 Google Shopping, recitals 341-343.
63 Google Shopping, recital 16.
64 Google Shopping, recitals 379-396.
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search result list on the first page as well as amongst the first links in the 
search result list.65 Thus, the system would “prioritise” Google Shopping 
services over competing shopping services. as a consequence, Google 
would leverage its market power in the market for generic search services 
to the market for shopping services.
Google Shopping is a “typical” case illustrative of the new economy. to 
begin with, it concerns a multi-sided market. While the offering of general 
search services constitutes one side of the market, the other side consists of 
offering merchants the possibility to market their products, either through 
a service like adWords or comparative shopping services. The case also 
concerns a service, general search services, which formally seems to be 
“free of charge”. While this is not completely accurate, as the Commission 
found that the users “paid” by granting data to Google, the company does 
not directly monetise through the “payment” of personal data by end-
users, but indirectly by the use of those data at a subsequent stage by target-
ing the needs of the particular consumer. additionally, Google indirectly 
monetises the value of its general search services through adWords or its 
comparative shopping services as merchants either pay for the visibility or 
each click that goes to the merchant website which generates income. 
an essential element in the Commission’s argument was that consum-
ers would normally only click the highest ranked results on the list, in 
particular those appearing on the first webpage. This finding was based 
specifically on a market survey referred to in the Commission’s decision. 
it could be discussed to what extent the situation above actually con-
cerns consumer inertia. arguably, the disincentive for consumers to scroll 
through more than the first page of search hits and to focus their atten-
tion on the first hits in the list of results may be characterised as inertia. 
Moreover, if this view is accepted, it could also be debated whether such 
inertia is caused by a rational cost-benefit analysis or by a behavioural bias. 
obviously, the reviewing of search results going beyond the first page of 
search results would constitute a cost for consumers which may simply not 
render in the finding of better or sufficiently valuable results for such an 
in-depth review to be worth the effort. alternatively, consumers may sim-
ply not engage in such a cost-benefit analysis before reviewing the results. 
instead, consumers are “lazy” and shy away from the more complex 
65 Google Shopping, recitals 379-396.
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process of predicting the value of reviewing more results and instead per-
ceive the first hits as the most relevant ones. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Commission, similar to the Microsoft 
cases, primarily relied on consumer behavioural patterns established 
through market surveys rather than on a more general and theoretical 
argument based on costs or behavioural biases.
5.3. Google Android
The ongoing investigation of Google also concerns its practices regarding 
the android system. The Commission sent a statement of objections in 
2016 about tying practices regarding agreements and restrictive clauses 
entered into by Google with oEMs in the smartphone market.66 android’s 
operating system for smartphone devices is used in approximately 80 % 
of all smartphones.67 android is an open-source system. in theory, this 
means that oEMs may offer their smartphones with an android open 
source version (so-called android fork).
The agreements entered into by Google would impose an obligation on 
oEMs that want to include applications such as Google’s Youtube and Play 
Store not to install an android fork on any devices (the anti-Fragmentation 
agreements or aFas). Moreover, Google also obliges oEMs that wish to 
install Play Store to install Google Search as a default search engine and 
oEMs that want to install Play Store and Search to install Google Chrome 
(Chrome) as a default web browser (the Mobile application distribution 
agreements or Madas).68 
although the detailed reasoning on the anticompetitive mechanisms is 
not described in the Commission’s press release, it seems that also this case 
relies, partly, on consumer inertia. importantly, for anti-competitive effects 
to occur as regards the provision of competing general search engines and 
web browsers, it is required that oEMs, as well as end-consumers, do not 
have an incentive to install and use competing products. Similar to both 
Microsoft cases, it seems that the demonstration of elimination of compe-
tition would require that end-consumers have no incentives to download 
and install competing products on their mobile devices. However, in par-
allel to the Microsoft cases, this would likely not be enough if oEMs would 
66 European Commission, MEMo 16/1484.
67 Federico Etro and Cristina Caffarra, “on the economics of the android case”, European 
Competition Journal 13 (2017): 284. 
68 European Commission, MEMo 16/1484.
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have incentives to install competing products alongside Google Search 
and Chrome. While in Microsoft and internet Explorer oEMs would suf-
fer a cost disadvantage when installing rival products, the main problem 
in Google android appears to be the limited space in mobile devices. Thus, 
consumer inertia seems merely to be a contributing factor that reinforces 
the contractual ties imposed on oEMs. For suppliers offering alternatives 
to Google Search and Chrome, the combination of contractual ties and 
consumer inertia creates entry barriers. Competing suppliers would either 
have to overcome the contractual ties by “paying off” oEMs to install their 
products or to invest heavily into their products to increase their installed 
base. in addition, the contracts targeting the use of android forks dimin-
ish the possibility of competing suppliers to convince oEMs to use alter-
native products. to overcome such a barrier, alternative suppliers would 
also need to offer alternatives to those products that trigger the aFa, like 
Youtube. 
in sum, the situation in Google android does not appear to differ from 
the Microsoft cases. Consumer inertia does not seem to be the decisive 
factor that results in an anti-competitive effect. However, without con-
sumer inertia, there would be a risk that the measures taken by Google 
to promote its own products and services would be unsuccessful as end-
consumers could eliminate such effects by actively seeking, downloading 
and using competing products.    
5.4. Microsoft/LinkedIn
at the end of 2016, the Commission took a favourable decision, after com-
mitments, on the acquisition of linkedin by Microsoft.69 Similar to the 
previous Microsoft cases, one of the problematic issues was that the com-
pany would leverage its market power in the market for oS for PCs into 
neighbouring markets. in this case, the risk of leveraging of market power 
concerned the market for Professional Social Network (PSN) services. as 
commonly known, linkedin constitutes a platform that connects profes-
sionals, including prospective employers and employees. according to 
the Commission, Microsoft had the possibility of pre-installing linkedin 
through an application in Windows oS for PCs that would result in the 
exclusion of other PSN services that competed with linkedin.
69 Commission decision of 6 december 2016 (M.8124 – Microsoft/linkedin).
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importantly, and parallel to the previous Microsoft cases, the 
Commission held that pre-installation could make switching more diffi-
cult due to consumer inertia. in fact, the Commission explicitly referred 
to the status quo bias.70 in addition, the Commission found that the sign-
up on PCs was the most important segment for PSNs such as linkedin. 
Moreover, suppliers of competing PSNs would not have effective coun-
terstrategies against the pre-installation of linkedin. Specifically, oEMs 
would not have incentives to pre-install alternative PSNs.71 However, the 
Commission finally cleared the merger after commitments made by the 
merging parties which e.g. permitted oEMs not to install the linkedin 
application and users to remove such application.72
it follows that the Commission followed its previous line of argumenta-
tion in Microsoft and internet Explorer. an additional interesting aspect 
of the case is the fact that it concerned a prospective analysis under the 
Merger regulation. By contrast to Microsoft, internet Explorer and Google 
Shopping, the Commission could not rely on customer surveys present-
ing empirical evidence of the presence of consumer inertia in the relevant 
market. instead, it seems that the Commission simply made an assump-
tion based on its previous practice, an approach that could be viewed as 
problematic. as discussed under section 2, the behavioural approach to 
consumer inertia does not provide enforcers of antitrust law with sufficient 
specific factors that determine when consumer groups may be subject to 
inertia or the degree of such inertia. Without such guidelines, it becomes 
difficult to assess whether the Commission’s finding was accurate, and it 
appears to be a pretty far-reaching claim that consumer inertia will always 
be present as soon as consumers are presented with a default option. in any 
case, it seems as Microsoft/linkedin, so far, gives the strongest support to 
the theory that the Commission has accepted the behavioural approach to 
consumer inertia in tying cases. 
6. Conclusions
Consumer inertia must be seen as a concept that by now is firmly estab-
lished within EU Competition law. in the landmark Microsoft case, the 
General Court seems to have accepted the presence of consumer inertia as 
a supporting factor demonstrating that technical integration of different 
70 Microsoft/linkedin, recitals 309 and 320.
71 Microsoft/linkedin, recital 320.
72 Microsoft/linkedin, recitals 453-454.
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products could have a similar effect as outright coercion. Whether the 
General Court truly accepted the behavioural approach to consumer iner-
tia could be debated. Nonetheless, the Commission has based subsequent 
decisions like internet Explorer, Google Shopping and Microsoft/linkedin 
on the General Court’s statement in Microsoft while shifting gradually to a 
behavioural approach.
a second observation that should be made, although an obvious one, is 
that even if the Commission and the General Court may have embraced 
consumer inertia as a factor that supports leveraging in tying cases, it 
remains to be seen whether the theory of consumer inertia will be accepted 
by the Court of Justice. in addition, consumer inertia has, so far, only been 
a relevant factor in tying/bundling situations. From the theoretical discus-
sion above, it could be speculated whether consumer inertia may also be 
relevant in cases regarding refusal to supply.
a third interesting observation is the fact that consumer inertia has 
emerged as a relevant factor in cases regarding the new economy. as stated 
above, consumer inertia, as such, is not particular to markets in the new 
economy. Nonetheless, two typical features of the new economy seem to 
make consumer inertia a more important factor in antitrust cases. Firstly, 
the presence of multi-sided markets in the new economy opens up for con-
sumer inertia to have an impact on the possibility for firms to leverage 
market power across markets. Secondly, it seems that many of these mar-
kets concern a more direct relation between suppliers and end-consumers, 
which is illustrated by cases on web browsers, search engines and media 
players. Thus, arguably, the behaviour of consumers has had a more direct 
impact in the antitrust analysis, especially in the assessment of the elimi-
nation of competition in the market. By contrast, previous and more tradi-
tional cases on e.g. tying normally concerned the relation between manu-
facturers and suppliers where the behavioural patterns of end-consumers 
were unlikely to have a decisive effect. it seems that this increased focus on 
actual consumer behaviour constitutes a challenge for antitrust authori-
ties as end-consumers are perceived to be more susceptible to irrational 
behaviour as discussed in behavioural economics. From such a perspec-
tive, the use of consumer inertia as a behavioural bias is probably a natural 
response and logical development in antitrust law.      
another observation is that the Commission has so far used con-
sumer inertia only as a supporting factor for foreclosure. in most cases, 
the Commission has demonstrated other factors that have prevented 
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effective counterstrategies by competitors. in Microsoft, internet Explorer, 
Microsoft/linkedin, and probably also in Google android, the key factor 
has been the barrier created by e.g. the costs for oEMs to add a competing 
product or the limited space for pre-installing such a competing product. 
Consequently, competing suppliers have effectively been hindered to over-
come the effects of consumer inertia. Thus, the presence of consumer iner-
tia, as such, seems not to have triggered antitrust liability in these cases.
Moreover, it should also be noted that in almost all cases discussed 
above, the Commission has used the theory of consumer inertia to 
explain the patterns of consumer behaviour based on customer surveys. 
only in Microsoft/linkedin was there no such empirical support for the 
Commission’s claim. However, Microsoft/linkedin concerned a pro-
spective merger analysis where such a customer survey was not avail-
able. For this reason, the case constitutes the strongest indication that 
the Commission has accepted a pure behavioural approach to consumer 
inertia and thus the inherent “irrationality” of consumers. as pointed out 
above, the behavioural approach in Microsoft/linkedin could be subject 
to criticism. For instance, it could be debated whether the consumers in 
Microsoft/linkedin were comparable to consumers in previous cases 
where the existence of consumer inertia had already been established with 
empirical evidence. if not, it could be questioned on basis of what evidence 
the Commission asserted for its finding of consumer inertia. This illus-
trates the current weakness with the behavioural approach to consumer 
inertia, as there is no clear guidance on how to establish it in real cases, 
apart from empirical studies.  
Finally, the theory of consumer inertia gives a perfect example of how 
behavioural economics is gaining ground in competition law reasoning in 
actual cases. While such a development should be welcomed, it should not 
be overstated as a behavioural “revolution”. The strength of behavioural 
theories is that they may explain, especially when backed up by empirical 
evidence, consumer patterns that would otherwise be inexplicable accord-
ing to traditional economic theory. Thus, behavioural theories comple-
ment the toolbox based on traditional economic models that is normally 
applied in antitrust cases. Such a view is supported by the cases on con-
sumer inertia, which clearly show that there was a mixture of a behav-
ioural bias and typical entry barriers in the form of cost disadvantages and 
network effects that resulted in anti-competitive effects.
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